

Beyond Core Duties: A Framework for Reimagining Community Health Worker Contributions to Health Systems

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Abstract

Community Health Workers (CHWs) are essential to global health systems, yet existing research predominately focuses on their core responsibilities, such as maternal and child health, without accounting for the full scope of their labor. This study examines the overlooked dimensions of CHW work through an ethnographic case study of Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) in urban India. Drawing on three months of participant observation and 25 in-depth interviews with ASHAs and health system stakeholders across two sites in Punjab, we identified three interrelated workstreams that define ASHA labor: core duties, secondary responsibilities, and supplementary engagements. Core duties are formally mandated health services implemented through health-related offices. Secondary responsibilities – such as election duties – are often imposed on ASHAs by the health system, but are driven by priorities of non-health ministries. Supplementary engagements involve paid or unpaid work with non-governmental organizations and private actors. Together, these workstreams reveal the extent to which ASHAs are relied upon to fill systemic gaps in under-resourced public systems. These crucial overlapping roles frequently stretch ASHAs beyond their capacity, affecting their ability to deliver on core maternal and child health responsibilities and exposing them to exploitative or informal labor arrangements. Our findings underscore the inadequacy of current frameworks that fail to capture the full complexity of CHW roles. We propose a new conceptual framework to analyze CHW labor holistically, grounded in their personal experiences and the institutional constraints that they face. This framework lays the groundwork for rethinking CHW labor across global contexts, guiding research, policy, and practice aimed at ensuring fair compensation, clearer role delineation, and stronger systemic support for CHWs and for more equitable health systems.

1 Introduction

2 Community Health Worker (CHWs) programs, initially conceived as temporary solutions
3 to health challenges, have evolved into vital components of global health systems (1,2).
4 Predominantly women, CHWs have become essential to the smooth functioning of health
5 systems (3). Literature to date has examined their core duties in health system functioning –
6 their work as community mobilizers for immunization, promoters of maternal and child health,
7 distributors of preventive services, providers of clinical care, and contributors to epidemiological
8 surveillance and record-keeping (4). A systematic review of publications on CHWs from 2005 to
9 2014 found that the largest proportion of the literature – 35% or 235/678 of included studies –
10 exclusively focused on CHWs' contributions to maternal, child, and neonatal survival (5). The
11 remaining studies explored CHW contributions to other formal programmatic areas, including
12 vector-borne diseases, non-communicable diseases, tuberculosis, and HIV care.

13 Despite their essential role in health system functioning and health outcomes, CHWs
14 perform a significant amount of secondary and informal work that has not been explored in the
15 literature. Many studies that explore these types of tasks in any capacity focus on the '*task-*
16 *shifting*' of specific responsibilities – such as HIV or non-communicable disease management –
17 from overburdened health workers to CHWs (6–10). While studies that explore task-shifting
18 capture one dimension of the additional work placed on CHWs, they fail to account for the
19 broader expansion of CHW roles. As the task-shifting literature limits analyses to specific tasks,
20 it overlooks the full scope of CHWs' labor and the tensions they navigate in balancing formal
21 mandates, additional tasks, and self-initiated responsibilities. Addressing this gap – as our study
22 aims to do – is crucial for fully understanding CHWs' contributions and informing policies.

23 Some literature has explored how frontline health workers manage their core duties
24 alongside the informal roles and secondary responsibilities they take on. In Uganda, drug shop
25 vendors who were constrained by systemic inefficiencies were often found to supplement their

26 formal roles with informal practices to sustain their livelihoods, and meet the needs of
27 community members (11). Similarly, private providers and chemists in India reported navigating
28 formal and informal obligations, filling systemic gaps in ways that blurred regulatory boundaries
29 (12). In Senegal, auxiliary staff and informal brokers reported being assigned tasks outside of
30 their official roles to bridge gaps in under-resourced public systems (13). The CHW literature
31 has also documented systemic tensions when examining how voluntary CHWs balance their
32 assigned health responsibilities with other economic activities to earn an income (14,15). These
33 studies frame these experiences as instances of ‘problem solving corruption’ (16–18), or
34 informal or unauthorized practices that frontline workers engage in; not for personal gain, but to
35 navigate systemic constraints, fill institutional voids, or meet community needs when formal
36 systems fall short. In doing so, the literature overlooks broader dimensions of their roles and the
37 lived realities of healthcare workers’ responsibilities. CHWs frequently assume additional
38 responsibilities beyond their core health-related duties, often undertaking tasks that are
39 assigned informally and lack financial compensation. Given the limited literature on this aspect
40 of CHWs' work, it is essential to examine how CHWs shape and negotiate their roles – not just
41 as instances of ‘problem-solving corruption’ or strategies for financial survival – but as essential
42 health system contributions.

43 In this study, we examined the multifaceted roles of CHWs through a case study of
44 Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) – a type of CHW – across two urban sites in Punjab,
45 India. We identified the following three workstreams that aim to capture the full scope of ASHA
46 responsibilities: (1) *Core Duties* – mandated health tasks such as maternal and child health
47 services; (2) *Secondary Responsibilities* – additional duties imposed on ASHAs by the health
48 system, often driven by external agencies; and (3) *Supplementary Engagement* – opportunities
49 with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or private sector actors that provide financial
50 incentives.

51 The roles that ASHAs occupy cannot be understood in isolation from the broader
52 systems that shape them. How ASHAs interpret and navigate their responsibilities is deeply
53 influenced by the training they receive, the degree of programmatic support they are afforded,
54 and the implicit and explicit expectations placed upon them by supervisors, community
55 members, and the health system at large. By shedding light on the complexities of these
56 elements of the health system, ASHAs' roles in balancing formal health responsibilities, ad-hoc
57 assignments, and independent income-generating activities, we aim to offer a more
58 comprehensive understanding and realistic model of CHWs' roles within health systems.

59

60 **BACKGROUND: THE ASHA PROGRAM**

61 Established under the National Rural Health Mission in 2005 and later expanded to urban areas
62 through the National Urban Health Mission in 2013, the ASHA program seeks to enhance
63 equitable healthcare access and reinforce health service delivery for underserved communities
64 in rural and urban settings (19,20). The urban component was specifically introduced to improve
65 health outcomes among the urban poor by offering care through a network of Urban Primary
66 Health Centers, Urban Community Health Centers, and urban ASHAs (21). ASHAs play a
67 crucial role in increasing awareness of key social determinants of health, including nutrition,
68 sanitation, and hygiene, while also providing additional targeted support to marginalized groups.
69 Their responsibilities include ensuring continuity of care through home visits, accompanying
70 patients to healthcare facilities, and organizing outreach initiatives such as Health and Nutrition
71 Days. Additionally, ASHAs are expected to collaborate with local organizations to enhance
72 community engagement in health initiatives and empower women as active participants in
73 health advocacy (20). Despite this heavy workload, ASHAs are formally considered to be
74 'volunteers' by the government. While ASHAs receive a small monetary honorarium that differs
75 across states, most of their income comes from performance-based incentives linked to specific

76 maternal and child health services such as antenatal care visits, vaccination visits, or maternal
77 delivery, post-natal follow-up visits, and other tasks.

78

79 **Methods**

80 Data were collected over approximately three months across two sites in Punjab, India.
81 The first site was an urban city with approximately 1 million residents, characterized by a
82 growing number of malls, business centers, and newly constructed residential apartment
83 complexes. The second site was a peri-urban setting with a population of approximately
84 500,000 people, characterized by its unique blend of rural and emerging urban elements,
85 attracting a significant number of migrants for agricultural work and employment in local
86 industrial positions.

87 This work was conducted by the first author (referred to as “I”) between September-
88 December 2023, with rapport building in late September and initial participant recruitment
89 starting on 04/10/2023 and ending on 07/12/2023. I conducted participant observation with 28
90 ASHA workers across the two sites, interacting with ASHAs six days a week for several hours
91 each day as they carried out their responsibilities. These activities included door-to-door
92 community outreach, vaccination sessions, hospital visits, survey work, ad-hoc tasks, meetings,
93 and interactions with community members and other health system actors. As an 'active
94 observer,' I participated in all ASHA activities, conducted formal and informal interviews, and
95 engaged socially with ASHAs and their families, fostering rapport and gaining a deeper
96 understanding of their experiences. During participant observation I took jottings during
97 interactions, which were later expanded into detailed field notes that captured reflections on
98 daily activities and identified emerging questions for further exploration.

99 I conducted 25 formal in-depth interviews, supplemented by additional informal
100 interviews. These included 13 interviews with ASHAs and 12 with stakeholders (i.e.

101 policymakers, program implementers, and health officers) across the health system. Interviews
102 ranged from 20 minutes to two hours. Most interviews were conducted in Punjabi, and two
103 stakeholder interviews were conducted in English. All interviews were audio-recorded, except
104 two where stakeholders declined consent for recording; in these cases, detailed field notes were
105 taken instead. I transcribed and translated all interview recordings and reviewed transcripts and
106 field notes weekly with members of the research team to identify data gaps and areas for future
107 probing. After completing data collection, I inductively developed a comprehensive codebook
108 comprising primary codes and sub-codes. This codebook was then applied to all transcripts and
109 field notes using MAXQDA for analysis (22).

110 Individuals who were observed or interviewed underwent a written informed consent
111 process as outlined in ethical approvals from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
112 Health (IRB #25369), Panjab University (ECR-2308-162), and the Punjab National Health
113 Mission (NMH/PB/CCP/2023/106613-16). In accordance with the *American Anthropological*
114 *Association's Statement on Ethics and Principles of Professional Responsibility*, I prioritized
115 ongoing consent as an integral part of the study design and implementation process (23). As
116 ethnography has the potential to blur lines between research and friendship (24), I engaged in
117 ongoing discussions to clarify whether participants intended their shared experiences to be
118 treated as research data or as personal discussions; discussions not considered to be data
119 were excluded from field notes.

120 I conducted research as a first-generation Punjabi American which significantly impacted
121 the way this research unfolded. I largely benefited from my identity, regularly being told, "*You*
122 *are one of us, so I'll help you*". Further, my identity contributed to my ability to quickly build
123 bonds. Once, after spending 20 minutes with an ASHA, she told me with a shy smile on her
124 face, "*It doesn't feel like we just met. Does it feel like we just met to you?*" I truthfully told her it
125 felt like we had known each other for a long time. These interactions created a unique '*insider-*
126 *outsider*' dynamic (25) between me and ASHAs; I was enough of an insider for them to feel

127 comfortable being honest, yet enough of an outsider for them to provide substantial detail to
128 ensure I fully understood what they shared.


129

130 Results

131 **** All names changed to maintain participant privacy****

132 This study leveraged this case study of the ASHAs to identify three distinct workstreams
133 that define the scope of responsibilities for CHWs. The first, *Core Duties*, encompasses the
134 core, mandated tasks integral to a CHWs role, such as maternal and child health services and
135 community outreach. The second, *Secondary Responsibilities*, includes additional
136 responsibilities imposed by the government, but driven by demands from agencies outside of
137 their mandated roles, such as directives from non-health ministries. The third, *Supplementary*
138 *Engagement*, typically involves private sector actors, NGOs, or other entities offering financial
139 incentives. CHWs often undertake this work to supplement their limited income. Together, these
140 workstreams illustrate the complex ways CHWs engage within the health system (Figure 1).
141 Our research describes these interlocking workstreams in the context of the case study of
142 ASHAs in India.

143 **Figure 1: Framework to Assess CHW Engagement Within the Health System**



144

145 **Core Duties**

146 As part of ASHAs' core responsibilities, they were required to engage with the health
147 system in formal, institutionalized ways, acting as conduits for primary healthcare services,
148 maternal and child health services, community-based structures, and other tasks assigned
149 through government health ministries. As a part of these core duties, ASHAs serve as the first
150 point of contact for marginalized populations, ensuring access to essential health services,
151 facilitating health awareness among communities, and providing broad health counseling.
152 Further, their work extends beyond individual health interventions to include community-based
153 engagement with local health committees. ASHAs reported that these core duties were often
154 linked to specific financial incentives, which varied significantly. ASHAs explained that they
155 typically earned nothing for facilitating a community meeting, earned one rupee (less than \$0.01
156 USD) for distributing oral rehydration solution packets, and earned 150 rupees (less than \$2
157 USD) for staying overnight with a mother for a hospital delivery.

158 Diya, an ASHA who had been working for a year, exemplified the core ASHA duties
159 during one of her routine visits. While walking to conduct household surveys, we walked past a
160 construction site. Diya excitedly explained that this was going to be a mall with brand-name
161 stores and high-end restaurants. She abruptly stopped talking and frowned as she looked
162 ahead at wood and sheet metal structures on the side of the main road.

163 Although I could see people within the unfinished structures, I thought she was gazing at
164 the remnants of a construction project. I suddenly realized that this was a temporary settlement,
165 something Diya had recognized immediately. As we entered the 'neighborhood', there were at
166 least fifty people, most of them young men, women, and small children playing. "*This wasn't*
167 *here the last time I came by,*" Diya told me, suggesting that the settlement had been put up quite
168 recently. Recognizing the vulnerability of the families living there, her initial cheerful tone
169 became serious, and she began to systematically approach her work. Pulling out her notebook,

170 Diya wrote down the names of pregnant women and assessed the children’s health and
171 vaccination status.

172 After observing several children with a similar rash, she gathered their caregivers.
173 *“Chalo! Let’s all go to the health center – Doctor Sahib (sir) will look at them and help,”* she said
174 as she led them to the local health center for treatment. As they walked, Diya explained the
175 services available at the primary health center, *“You won’t have to pay anything for this care –*
176 *you give your name and your Aadhar (social security and identification) card, and you’ll just wait*
177 *a few minutes to get your child looked at.”* One mother, visibly relieved, said, *“We didn’t know*
178 *this was available. No one tells us!”*

179 For Diya, this outreach was part of her core duties; she was expected to connect
180 underserved communities with existing government health services. She understood these core
181 responsibilities and went about fulfilling them without expectation. Despite their importance and
182 the amount of time they required, these activities did not generate any income for Diya, as they
183 were not linked to a specific incentive.

184 Participants also reported that as part of ASHAs’ core duties, they were expected to
185 engage with community-based organizations, such as Mahila Arogya Samitis (MAS) or
186 Women’s Health Committees. An ASHA with five years of experience, shared the complexities
187 of this community-based work. *“This is something we’re supposed to do,”* she said, referring to
188 her role in coordinating MAS activities. *“They tell us to explain nutrition, breastfeeding, and*
189 *sanitation in these meetings, but no one gives us the money we are supposed to have to*
190 *conduct these meetings. Over time, people have stopped showing up.”* Although ASHAs do not
191 receive direct incentives for implementing MAS meetings, they are supposed to receive funds to
192 facilitate them; sadly, these funds are often not provided. Additionally, there is an expectation
193 that the connections ASHAs build through these meetings will help them earn incentives in the
194 future.

195 These interpretations of what constitute an ASHAs' core duties did not occur in a
196 vacuum. Across sites, ASHAs consistently described gaps in both formal training and
197 supervisory support that shaped how they navigated their duties (26). Many ASHAs report
198 working without the mandated eight-day induction, relying instead on peers or overburdened
199 supervisors to guide them. While some learned their responsibilities through informal
200 mentorship, others described feeling underprepared and overwhelmed (26). The absence of
201 structured training and inconsistent support meant that ASHAs adapted their roles with limited
202 formal guidance, often drawing boundaries around their work based on what they were told by
203 their supervisors, or what they felt capable or obligated to do, rather than a clear understanding
204 of programmatic expectations or specific ASHA guidelines.

205 ASHAs' deep community ties and their ability to navigate complex health needs made
206 them highly effective in their core responsibilities; in turn, this success in building trust and
207 facilitating access to care led to increased reliance on them for tasks beyond their official
208 mandates.

209 **Secondary Responsibilities**

210 In addition to their assigned core duties, ASHAs were often tasked with additional
211 responsibilities, and they were promised small incentives as compensation. Government
212 officials outside the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare – where ASHAs are based –
213 frequently delegated extra work to them, including supporting population surveys, election
214 efforts, and educational initiatives. This over-reliance on ASHAs stemmed from both their strong
215 community ties and the essential role they played in service delivery. Several external factors
216 also contributed to this dependence on ASHAs, including chronic workforce shortages across
217 other sectors, the expansion of government health programs without corresponding investments
218 in personnel, and the expectation that ASHAs would bridge gaps in service delivery due to their
219 embeddedness within communities. These secondary tasks were routinely assigned under the

220 assumption that ASHAs' voluntary status and modest honorariums made them readily available
221 and flexible.

222 A district-level officer captured this overreliance of ASHAs vividly. As I sat in her office for
223 an interview, she began listing the expansion of ASHAs' tasks beyond their core responsibilities,
224 counting them off on her fingers, "*On top of maternal and child health work, they have so much*
225 *more. One, they have to do outbreak investigation – dengue, measles, anything.*" She stopped,
226 frowned, and looked at me. "*You should be writing this down,*" she said. I grabbed my pen and
227 started. Pleased, she continued. "*Next, they have all this survey work for the health center. Then*
228 *they expect her – a woman – to go talk to men about the dangers of crop burning. They have to*
229 *also do election work whenever the government says. And even now, they're the ones being*
230 *told to go and do the implementation of all these government schemes [programs].*" Her
231 frustration was palpable: "*ASHAs should be about maternal and child health. When the ASHAs*
232 *were appointed, they were appointed by the National Health Mission. So why are they being*
233 *asked to do all this other work?*"

234 As this district officer shared, non-health Ministries leveraged ASHAs' connections to the
235 community to complete other tasks. Deepti, a peri-urban ASHA, shared she had recently been
236 tasked with educating people who had small plots of land against crop burning. Even though
237 crop burning was the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture, the ASHAs' supervisor told her
238 it was her "*duty*" to educate people against this, as there were health implications. Resigned to
239 this new responsibility, she explained, "*They told me it's causing pollution and affecting people's*
240 *lungs. So, now it's my job to tell people to stop burning their plots.*" Another ASHA spoke about
241 work that was assigned to them by the Election Commission of India, saying, "*You know the*
242 *2022 election? Our district officer made us go to the polling location at 5:30am. They said*
243 *because people needed masks and sanitizers this was health-related, so it's our duty.*"

244 In addition to supporting non-health ministries with their work, stakeholders reported that
245 ASHAs were regularly asked to support vertical disease programs. A state-based health officer

246 expressed frustration with this, as vertical programs had their own staff, and should not need the
247 ASHA to complete day-to-day support. *“What are all these other people doing?”* she angrily
248 asked in an interview. *“All these other people in vertical programs can do the work, but they just
249 say have the ASHA do it.”* ASHAs were similarly frustrated with their engagement in vertical
250 programs. *“We go and help the patients – we have no choice, and we don’t always get an
251 incentive for this. We just have our orders from above. We can’t even say anything back. They
252 just say, ‘this is the ASHAs work’.”*

253 ASHAs are often expected to reconcile the demands of core duties and secondary
254 responsibilities on the ground. The success of these processes and outcomes vary due to the
255 limited time, resources and agency granted to the ASHAs. During participant observation with
256 Priyanka, an ASHA who had only been in her role for four months, we walked to a three-level
257 house which had been converted into three apartments. Before ringing the bell to the apartment,
258 Priyanka warned me, *“She’s a bit rude. She told me to stop coming so often. I [already] had to
259 go for her antenatal care visit, then they sent me to do a dengue survey, then to fill out a form to
260 see if anyone had ‘sugar’ (diabetes) or ‘pressure’ (hypertension), and now they’re sending me to
261 tell her to register for this insurance program.”* Priyanka’s prediction was correct – the resident
262 sighed as she opened the door, saying, *“I told you last time, you should call. Please don’t just
263 show up.”* Priyanka nodded apologetically, tugged my arm, and we quickly walked away.

264 Although their strong community ties make them ideal messengers for various
265 government initiatives, the increasing delegation of responsibilities outside their core duties
266 raises concerns.

267 **Supplementary Engagement**

268 Participants further reported that ASHAs are drawn into supplementary forms of
269 engagement with NGOs, private sector actors, and alternative medicine providers. Some of
270 these engagements are structured and generally accepted, such as when NGOs recruit ASHAs
271 to assist with piloting interventions, conducting community outreach, participating in training

272 sessions, or leading data collection efforts. These activities are often viewed by those in the
273 health system as ‘acceptable tasks’ for ASHAs to take on, since they ultimately serve the
274 community.

275 When asked about compensation for work with NGOs, one ASHA explained,
276 *“Sometimes they give us a little money or small gifts, like a sari. But other times they promise*
277 *payment and never give it to us.”* These interactions with NGOs, while presented as
278 opportunities for ASHAs, often fail to deliver tangible benefits; they instead add to ASHAs’
279 workloads without clear accountability or oversight.

280 Other supplementary arrangements, particularly those involving private health providers
281 or alternative medicine practitioners, primarily serve to supplement ASHAs’ incomes rather than
282 benefit community health. As these engagements are typically viewed in a negative light by
283 those in and out of the health system, they are often done secretly with no oversight. Local
284 pharmacists and other providers occasionally engaged ASHAs as intermediaries to sell their
285 products. One ASHA recounted how a ‘*medicine man*’ had paid her to refer patients to his stall.
286 *“I would send people to him for cheap medicines, and he gave me part of what he earned [from*
287 *selling to them],”* she explained. However, the informal nature of this arrangement left her
288 vulnerable; when his stall shut down, he disappeared, owing her unpaid commissions that she
289 was depending on to supplement her income.

290 ASHAs were also reported to engage with the private sector. A state-level stakeholder
291 described how ASHAs form supplementary partnerships with private health centers to make
292 ends meet, *“The government doesn’t pay them enough, so they end up working with private*
293 *centers. These centers give them a cut for referring patients.”* Rather than expressing frustration
294 at this arrangement, the stakeholder acknowledged it as an adaptive response to a system that
295 fails to meet ASHAs’ financial needs, and it forces ASHAs to seek out informal arrangements to
296 supplement their income.

297 These supplementary engagements highlight the precarious position ASHAs navigate as
298 they balance their own financial survival with their professional responsibilities.

299 **Unintended Consequences on Core Duties: Impact of Overburdening ASHAs**

300 The overlap of core, secondary, and supplementary workstreams significantly impacted
301 ASHAs' ability to focus on their primary maternal and child health responsibilities. While core
302 responsibilities are central to the role of ASHAs, secondary and supplementary duties often
303 stretched them beyond capacity.

304 ASHAs reported that their supplementary work with local NGOs required additional time
305 – often with a promise of payment that was not always met. These commitments frequently took
306 time away from their core duties, with one ASHA reporting, “*They make us do trainings for their*
307 *work, which takes up our time.*” As ASHAs were diverting their attention to this work, they often
308 had less time for essential duties, such as checking on expectant mothers that relied on them
309 for antenatal care and referrals.

310 A district officer similarly expressed concern that secondary responsibilities placed
311 undue burdens on ASHAs, and it inadvertently was contributing to maternal deaths. While these
312 deaths were infrequent enough to escape an outsider's notice, as an insider, she recognized
313 their significance because they occurred in areas that hadn't reported a maternal death in
314 decades. Although the specific causes behind the maternal deaths remained unclear, her
315 personal investigation revealed a common thread – ASHAs consistently cited their expanding
316 workload as a key factor in why they weren't able to identify vulnerable pregnant women.
317 “*ASHAs say they're being tasked with crop-burning education, population surveys, TB work, and*
318 *even election duties, on top of their ASHA responsibilities,*” she said, frustrated. “*As a result,*
319 *they can't properly focus on maternal and child health, which is their primary role.*”

320 The district officer's concerns felt especially relevant during my participant observation
321 with Rani. For two months, Rani had been going door-to-door in her expansive area to register
322 families for *Ayushman Bharat* – a government-funded health insurance program – a task

323 assigned to her as a secondary responsibility. During this time, two women who also fell in
324 Rani's assigned area gave birth at home instead of at a hospital; these were the first home
325 births in years in this area. When Rani's Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM) supervisor questioned
326 her about it, Rani defended herself saying, "*How can I be expected to catch them when the last*
327 *two months have been focused on the Ayushman registration? They told me they weren't that*
328 *far along, and I didn't have time to check. What was I supposed to do?"* While the ANM worker
329 grew sympathetic, she emphasized that maternal care must remain a priority, despite other
330 tasks. "*The priority must be mothers,*" she gently explained to Rani. "*The more home births we*
331 *start to have, the more chance that someone can die. We can't have maternal deaths in this*
332 *area. All trust will be gone.*"

333

334 Discussion

335 Our findings underscore the need for a nuanced understanding of the broad
336 contributions that ASHAs make to the Indian health system and a willingness to explore the
337 impact of overburdening on the primary healthcare system. While researchers and practitioners
338 have long anecdotally noted that CHWs take on responsibilities beyond their core duties, these
339 contributions are frequently under-researched or insufficiently examined in the literature. Much
340 of the global literature on CHWs, as well as ASHAs, centers on their core health duties, such as
341 health education, community outreach, and connecting community members to health services
342 (4,5,27). This narrow focus obscures the full range of their labor and the structural tensions they
343 navigate.

344 Existing frameworks that attempt to broadly define CHW roles – such as the WHO
345 Guidelines on Health Policy and System Support for CHWs – primarily focus on CHWs'
346 integration into public health systems. Newer frameworks that attempt to broaden the scope of
347 CHW roles, still largely focus on maternal and child health (28). In limiting the focus of CHW

348 responsibilities, this overlooks the informal, adaptive, and cross-sectoral dimensions (29) that
349 constitute additional work CHWs are expected to complete. Our proposed framework extends
350 prior efforts to conceptualize CHW roles, exemplified by Glenton et al (30). Their synthesis in
351 the 2021 supplement *Community Health Workers at the Dawn of a New Era* (31), published by
352 Health Research Policy, provided a foundation for understanding the range of CHW activities
353 across task-based work such as prevention, treatment, and social support. By situating CHWs'
354 responsibilities within our three interrelated workstreams, we offer a complementary, labor-
355 centered perspective that reveals how CHW roles expand in response to systemic gaps and
356 financial precarity. In doing so, we aim to expand existing frameworks to interrogate the
357 structural reasons behind role expansions.

358 The existing literature highlights that CHWs are leveraged to fill systemic gaps – at times
359 supporting underfunded programs, addressing staff shortages, or taking on ad-hoc assignments
360 (32–36); when highlighted, these instances are often framed as isolated adaptations or
361 temporary coping strategies (12–15). We argue that these are not isolated adaptations, but
362 systemic features of health systems that have come to rely on CHWs to absorb persistent gaps
363 in service delivery. Our findings call for a more comprehensive understanding of how
364 overextension is built into system design: mapping how responsibilities are distributed, how
365 institutions normalize flexible labor, and how CHWs navigate and negotiate these evolving roles.

366 To address this gap, we designed a framework that used bottom-up strategies to
367 incorporate these dimensions, offering a more accurate lens through which to understand the
368 diverse, adaptive, and often precarious nature of CHW labor. While rooted in the Indian context,
369 it is likely highly relevant across diverse settings, providing a starting point for comprehensive
370 research that recognizes and compensates the full spectrum of CHW responsibilities. This also
371 aligns with broader calls for reform across South Asia, where CHW programs are being
372 reimagined to better integrate with primary health care and respond to emerging health system
373 needs (37). By distinguishing between core duties, secondary assignments, and supplementary

374 engagements, this framework provides an analytical tool for assessing how CHW labor is
375 structured, how CHWs interpret their increasingly complex roles, how responsibilities evolve
376 under different governance systems, and provides an approach to identify and compensate
377 these contributions.

378 Our findings emphasize that secondary and supplementary assignments are not
379 marginal additions to the core responsibilities that are covered extensively in the literature.
380 Ministries and government agencies increasingly rely on CHWs to implement initiatives, such as
381 pollution awareness and election logistics, as secondary responsibilities. These assignments
382 show how CHWs are viewed as flexible labor, or the default workforce for broad public sector
383 initiatives (38). In doing so, this stretches CHW capacity without adjusting compensation,
384 training, or role clarity. Simultaneously, many CHWs who seek out supplementary engagements
385 with NGOs or private actors can be exposed to exploitative arrangements, irregular payments,
386 and potential conflicts with public health mandates. Left unregulated, both secondary and
387 supplementary engagements compromise CHW alignment with public health priorities and can
388 erode CHWs' financial security. These added burdens often exacerbate the very vulnerabilities
389 CHWs share with the communities they serve – such as food and housing insecurity – and can
390 contribute to psychological stress, burnout, and professional devaluation (39).

391 Addressing these tensions demands a structural shift in how CHW labor is recognized at
392 the health system and at the global governance level. As long as CHWs are classified as
393 "volunteers" – while being expected to perform essential services – they may continue to seek
394 supplemental work to survive. Governments that wish to reduce the negative consequences of
395 secondary and supplementary engagements may wish to confront this contradiction directly by
396 addressing CHWs' standing in the health system. By designating CHWs as volunteers rather
397 than formal employees, the state avoids obligations related to compensation, benefits, and
398 employment protections (40). However, this is a double-edged sword: the informal designation
399 exempts CHWs from rigid institutional mandates, which creates conditions that allow them to

400 pursue supplemental work. Formalizing CHW roles through integration into national health
401 workforce structures – with fair compensation, protections, and standards – offers a path toward
402 resolving this contradiction.

403 Ultimately, CHWs have become an indispensable, albeit undervalued, pillar of public
404 health delivery. Their labor, spanning core, secondary, and supplementary responsibilities,
405 reflects a broader systemic dependence on flexible, low-cost, and often invisible work. To fully
406 recognize their contributions, researchers must explore and document the full spectrum of CHW
407 engagement, implementers must ground their strategies in CHWs' lived realities, and
408 policymakers must build robust support systems that reflect the true conditions CHWs navigate.
409 This requires more than top-down policy fixes – it demands embedded approaches that move
410 beyond technocratic framings and capture the social, emotional, and structural dimensions of
411 CHWs' labor. Without this depth of engagement, we risk simplifying the very systems we aim to
412 improve.

413 Among the ASHAs we studied, the blurred boundaries between core, secondary, and
414 supplementary roles also signals a shifting health system ecosystem in which ASHAs may be
415 increasingly positioned at the intersection of public and private sector interests. With the rise of
416 national insurance schemes like the Ayushman Bharat– Pradhan Mantri Jan Aarogya Yojana
417 (PMJAY), launched in 2018, many private hospitals can be empaneled into the governments'
418 PMJAY system, and can then bill the government for care provided to eligible patients. With
419 more private hospitals joining this scheme (41), there is a growing potential for ASHAs to be
420 leveraged by private actors to funnel patients into their care. This raises concerns about the
421 potential redirection of patients towards profit-driven entities, possibly at the expense of
422 equitable care. Policymakers in India would benefit from leveraging this framework to consider
423 the pathways government programs may opens for further privatization of care, fragmentation of
424 health care delivery, and deepening blurred boundaries of ASHAs roles.

425 While our framework draws on ethnographic fieldwork with ASHAs in India and
426 policymakers may benefit from documenting this full scope of work, the broader patterns we
427 identified are not unique to this setting. Globally, CHWs are similarly tasked with responsibilities
428 that exceed their formal mandates, often without sufficient support or compensation. By
429 distinguishing between core duties, secondary responsibilities, and supplementary
430 engagements, our framework provides a practical tool for global governments, program
431 managers, and donors to map CHW workloads more systematically, identify role inflation, and
432 design interventions that preserve CHWs' ability to deliver essential services. Without making
433 these distinctions, we risk continuing to collapse state-imposed burdens and informal coping
434 strategies under a generic category of "CHW work," obscuring the nature of CHW work and the
435 accountability of the system.

436 Future research must move beyond narrow evaluations of coverage or performance to
437 examine how CHWs navigate overlapping responsibilities, systemic gaps, and competing
438 institutional demands. The framework introduced in this study offers a foundation for such work
439 by clearly delineating the categories of CHW labor that demand further investigation.
440 Comparative and embedded studies across diverse settings are essential to uncover shared
441 patterns, surface context-specific challenges, and inform policy responses.

442 Reframing how we understand CHW responsibilities is not just about acknowledging
443 their work. It is about understanding the structures that quietly depend on CHWs' unpaid,
444 underpaid, and invisible labor, and committing to improving the health systems that are
445 supported through their labor.

446
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464

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Figure 1: Framework to Assess CHW Engagement Within the Health System

